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A major trend in the study of political behavior in 
America has been the increased utilization of national prob- 
ability samples, rather than samples drawn within a more 
limited geographical area. While early studies focussed on 
political behavior in the context of specific counties or 
cities,' more recent research has focussed on parameters of 
the national electorate, and on explanations of political 
choice that are not contingent upon locality  factor^.^ One 
result of this trend has been a decrease in the amount of 
attention paid to the interpersonal dynamics involved in the 
partisanship decision. Thus, an important and well documented 
source of variation, the norms of primary groups, has been 
3 systematically disregarded. 
I \  
* 8 
Berelson has suggested that when the primary groups to 
which one belongs do not provide an unambiguous definition of 
The classic studies in this tradition were done by the 
Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia University. 
See especially Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson and 
~aiel Gaudet, The People's Choice (~ew York: Columbia 
University Press, 1948), and Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. 
Lazarsfeld and William N. McPhee, Voting (Chicago: Uni- 
versity of Chicago Press, 1954). 
2. The more important of these researches have been carried 
out by the Survey Research Center, University of Michigan. 
See Angus Campbell and Robert L. Kahn, The People Elect A 
President (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 
Survey Research center Series # 9, 1952); Angus Campbell, 
Gerald Gurin and Warren E. Miller, The Voter Decides 
(Evanston: Row Peterson, 1954); Angus CampbeLl, Philip E. 
Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, The 
American Voter (New York: John Wiley, 1960); Angus Camp- 
bell, Philip E; Converse, Warren E. Miller, Donald E. 
Stokes,-Elections and Political Order (New York: John 
Wiley, 1966). 
3. See Sidney Verba, Small Groups and ~01itical.Behavior. 
(Princeton: Princeton University-Press, 1961), pp. 22 ff. 
the party one is expected to support, the dominant political 
climate in the community will attract the individual. Thus, 
the analysis of voting in a Republican town, Elmira, New York, 
in the 1948 election revealed that "the Republicans get more 
than their random share of the adjustment to a conflicting 
environment, because of the pervasive Republican atmosphere 
of Elmira that thus tends to perpetuate itself. "4 Such break- 
age effects are one example of a more general sociological 
concern with 'structural' or 'contextual' effects .' The rele- 
vant research question here is whether the attitudes and 
behaviors of an individual can be attributed to traits that 
he as an individual possesses, to characteristics of social 
collectivities to which he belongs, or to interactions between 
these two sets of variables. 
Recent research on the breakage effect has raised the 
question of defining units of analysis. Putnam, using national 
survey data for the 1952 presidential election, operationally 
defined "local community" as county, and the political climate 
of the county was then indexed by the Democratic percentage of 
4. Berelson, et al., m., p. 100. 
5. See Hanan C. Selvin, "Durkheim's Suicide and Problems of 
Empirical Research," American Journal of Sociology, vol. 
63 (1958), pp. 607-619; Peter M. Blau, "Structural 
~ffebts," American Sociological Review, vol. 25 (1960), 
PP. 178-193; James A. Davis, Joe L. Spaeth and Carolyn 
Hbson, "A ~echni~ue for ~ n a l ~ z i n ~  the- ~ffects of h rob^ 
Composition," American Sociological Review, vol. 26 (1961), 
pp. 215-225; Arnold S. Tannenbaum and Jerald G. Bachman, 
"Structural versus Individual Effects," American Journal 
of Sociology, vol. 69 (1964), pp. 585-595. 
the two-party vote cast for President in 1952.6 These latter 
data were based upon voting returns. The breakage hypothesis 
was confirmed in that people scoring high on an index of social 
integration were shown to lean toward the partisan mode in 
their areas. 
In another recent study, Segal and Meyer utilized voting 
wards in nine towns in the northeastern United States as units 
of analysis. Here, the wards were assigned collective socio- 
economic status (SES) rankings (high vs. low) on the basis of 
the status characteristics of the respondents clustered within 
them. Assuming that middle-class individuals favor the Repub- 
lican Party while working class people favor the Democratic 
Party, it was hypothesized that community SES would affect 
partisan choice above and beyond the>effect of individual SES. 
Thus, among low SES respondents, those living in high SES areas 
would be more likely to vote Republican than would those in low 
SES areas. It was anticipated that the community effect would 
be less for high SES respondents, since they would be more 
likely to have social ties outside of the local community, such 
as voluntary association memberships, and these would influence 
6. Robert D. Putnam, "Political Attitudes and the Local Com- 
munity," American Political Science Review, vol. LX,.no. 3 
(September, 1966) , pp. .640-654. 
their party choices. These hypotheses were borne out .by the 
data. 7 
The utilization of counties or voting wards as units of 
analysis, however, is satisfying neither in terms of the 
assumptions of contextual analxsis nor with regard to the 
assumed dynamics, of the breakage effect. In general, the col- 
lectivities utilized in the study of structural effects should 
be more than arbitrary categories between which statistically 
significant differences appear. They should refer to social 
aggregates that are meaningful to the individual respondents. 
It is difficult to argue seriously that one's county or ward . 
can universally be defined as a meaningful category in'this 
regard. More specially, the breakage effect seems to be 
predica-ted upon social influence through interpersonal inter- 
action. 
Cox has in fact demonstrated that those people whose 
social and organizational contacts are within the community 
are more susceptible to contextual effects than are people 
whose contacts extend beyond the community. This finding 
7. David R. Segal and Mars-hall W. ' ~ e ~ e r ,  "The Social Context 
of Political Partisanship," in Mattei Dogan.and Stein 
Rokkan, - eds., Quantitative Ecological Analysis in the 
Social Sciences (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1968. Forth- 
coming). Note that Segal and Meyer were concerned with 
the social context, while Putnam was concerned with the 
political context. Cf. Philip H. Ennis, "The Contextual 
Dimension in Voting," in William N. McPhee and William A. 
Glaser, - eds., Public Opinion and Congressional Elections 
(New York: Free Press, 1962), pp. 180-211. 
8. Kevin R. Cox, "The Spatial Structuring of Information Flow 
and Partisan Attitudes," Paper delivered at the Midwest 
Conference of Political Scientists (Purdue University, 
April, 1967) . 
resolves the major difference between Putnam's study and that 
of Segal and Meyer. Putnam found that social integration, 
measured in part by membership in voluntary associations, - in- 
creased the contextual effect. Segal.and Meyer-, on the other 
hand, argued that membership in,voluntary associations was an 
alternative to the local community as a source of political 
orientation. Since it is reasonable to argue that the volun- 
tary associations in which people actively participate tend to 
be more territorially extensive than voting wards, but more 
intensive than counties, the contradiction is accounted for. 
A third approach to the problem of breakage effects is 
to utilize areas defined as relevant by respondents as units 
of analysis, regardless of their correspondence to standardized 
units. Two techniques of measurement suggest themselves here. 
On the one hand, one can focus on phenomenological defini- 
tion of the situation, and accept the individual's perception 
of the community in which he lives as the independent variable. 
Alternatively, one can obtain from the respondent the bound- 
aries of the local community as he perceives them,' and aggre- 
gate available survey data within such a community to estimate 
the.social composition of that unit. 
The tasks '.of .- the present study, .then ,. are first, -.to 
determine the.,generality of.the breakage phenomenon- through 
replication, .-second, to compare ,the use of. census data and 
9. For-an example of this technique see Charles A. Goldsmid 
and Daniel H. Willick, "Perceptions of the.Urban Com- 
munity," Working.Paper No. 65, Center for Socia1,Organiza- 
tion Studies,(University of Chicago, . . 1966). 
aggregated survey data in estimating contextual parameters, and 
third, to compare the effects of real versus perceived neighbor- 
hood characteristics. 
The data utilized in attempting to confront these issues 
were taken from a cross-section sample of the population of 
Wayne County, Michigan, in 1957. lo In addition to collecting 
a wide range of political data, this study coded all respond- 
ents by census tract, voting precinct, congressional district 
and other residential units. Survey data could therefore be 
aggregated for each of these units, and for those units for 
which census data are available, data files could be mixed to 
ascertain the characteristics of the units independent of the 
respondents in this sample. 
Table 1 presents the reported per cent of Republican party 
preference when individual SES and census tract SES are varied. 
Table 1. Per Cent Republican, by Individual SES and Census 
Tract SES (estimate from aggregated survey data). 
Tract SES 
Low High 
Low 21.8 52.0 
Respondent's 
SES High 37. 8, 45.5 
10. For a description of the area, the sample and the research 
instrument see Samuel J. Eldersveld, Political Parties: A 
Behavioral Analysis (chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), esp. 
pp. 24-44, '547-478. 
The tract data here have been estimated by cumulating data for 
all respondents within each tract. The findings that appeared 
in the earlier studies are manifested here. Among low SES 
respondents, census tract differences are strongly related to 
party choice. The difference is much less among high SES 
respondents. Respondent SES also makes a good deal of differ- 
ence within low SES census tracts. while the difference due 
to individual SES within high SES tracts is small and opposite 
in direction to what we would expect, we regard this statistic 
as having low reliability because of the small number of 
respondents in the low SES cell. 
Table 2 presents these same data when census tract SES 
is measured by distributions reported in the 1960 census. 
Table 2. Per Cent Republican, by Individual SES and Census 




Low 22.8 30.6 
Respondent's (N (413) (62 1 
SES High 32.5 44.3 
(N (114) (122) 
The relative differences due to tract SES among low SES respon- 
dents,.and to differences in respondent SES within low SES 
tracts are greatly diminished,, but still apparent. .The differ- 
ence-.due to tract SES among high SES respondents is increased,- 
and is in fact greater than.that observed for low,SES re,spondents. 
While differences exist both with regard to total and cell 
N's and percentages, both tables support the hypothesis that 
party choice is related to community SES. 
Of the 95 tracts in which respondents resided, 26 could 
be classified by either census data or aggregated survey data, 
but not both. The difference in cell N's is due to the fact 
that of the 69 tracts for which both census and survey estimates 
existed, the estimates differed in 6 cases--slightly less than 
10 per cent of all cases for which both criteria were available. 
It appears then, that if sufficient respondents are clustered 
in a given geographical unit, survey data collected from those 
respondents can be used to estimate census parameters for the 
geographical unit. 
Three important  conclusions result from this analysis. 
First, we have replicated the study of northeastern towns and 
found that in Wayne County, community,SES is a significant 
determinant of party choice. Second, we have shown that break- 
age effects, -and, by inference, other structural effects as 
well, can be studied meaningfully by aggregating survey data 
to estimate characteristics of the structure involved. The 
condition suggested by the present data is that large N's must 
exist for all cells for the estimate to be considered reliable. 
Third, by validating.this method, we have freed the researcher 
from working with censal.or administrative units which may be 
phenomenologically meaningless to the respondent. Thus, local 
community areas, which may- have very dif£erent:boundaries from 
formalized unl.ts, .may be utilized in the.study oz. community 
efzects . 
We may now turn to the.problem of community perception. 
While we do not.have data on community boundaries as defined 
by our respondents, we do know how they perceive the' political 
composition of their neighborhoods. Two questions are impor- 
tant in this regard. First, we are interested in how well 
individuals perceive the partisan composition of their communi- 
ties. Here, we can only provide a basis for drawing weak 
inferences by comparing community perceptions with the partisan 
composition of arbitrary units. Second, we are concerned with 
the relationship between community perception and partisan 
choice. 
As Table 3 shows, for those people who attribute a 
partisan character to their neighborhoods there is no relation- 
ship between such perceptions and the actual partisan composi- 
tion of...census tracts. We. are unable .to determine with the 
available data whether this is due to the lack of coincidence 
of neighborhood and tract boundaries or to misperceptions of 
partisan composition. It is clear, however, that people who 
feel that they live in Republican neighborhoods are at least 
as likely as those who think they live in.Democratic neighbor- 
hoods to in fact live in preponderantly Democratic census 
tracts. The plurality of those who responded to the question 
perceive that they live in neighborhoods that are split evenly 
in partisan terms. The great majority of Detroiters, however, 
live in very stronglyDemocratic areas. 




G.O.P. Strong Strong 
in Tract Democrat. Democrat 50-50 Republican Republican 
> 6o 47 14 5 8 2 - - - - -
Total 100% 99% 100% 100% 99% 
Let us now turn to the impact of perception upon party 
choice. Fully 51 per cent of the respondents attached no 
partisan label to the neighborhoods in which they reside. This 
is especially interesting since almost two-thirds of the sample 
felt that they lived in socially homogeneous neighborhoods. 
Obviously, party choice is not an important factor in considera- 
tions of how similar or different people are. 
As Table 4 demonstrates, for those respondents who per- 
ceive their neighborhoods to have a partisan character, the 
same pattern holds here as has been demonstrated above. Low 
SES respondents appear to be as sensitive to the perceived 
political context as they are to the actual social context. 
Of those low SES respondents who live in neighborhoods perceived 
to be Democratic one-quarter support the Republican Party, but 
fully half of those in neighborhoods perceived to be strongly 
Republican support the G.O.P. The effect of..perceived community 
-11- 
partisanship is nowhere near as great for high SES respondents. 




dent ' s Strongly Strongly 
SES Democratic Democrat 50-50 Republican Republican 
Low 25.4 25.0 16.9 43.2 50.0 
High 45.0 44.4 36.8 42.4 55.6 
'L \ 
Alternative explanations'for differential responsiveness 
to either actual, or perceived community . . context as a function 
of occupation may be derived from three different areas of 
research. First, it might-be argued that high SES people are 
more likely than low SES people to belong to voluntary associa- 
tions outside of :the.local community, which provide alternative 
political cues to those of the immediate territorial unit. 
11 
Second, .alternative sources of,political orientation aside, 
this pattern might reflect the.well.docume.nted tendency for- 
the flow of influence..to .parallel - the status structure. l2 were 
these dynamics operating, we would expect low SES people living 
in high SES communities to conform to the political choices of 
11. Segal and- Meyer, -op.. cit. . . 
12. See for example-James C.. Moore, Jr.;."Status and Influ- 
ence in Small Group Interactions,". Sociometry (forthcom- 
ing) . 
their neighbors due to the recognized status differential. 
For exactly the same reason, we would expect high SES individ- 
uals in low SES neighborhoods not - to conform to the local 
partisan mode. When we speak of perceived community partisan- 
ship rather than objective social status, the logic becomes 
less direct, but the model still applies. We assume that most 
people subscribe,to the notion that the Republican Party repre- 
sents the interests of the middle-class, while the Democratic 
Party is more of a working-class party. We further assume-that 
individuals are more likely to perceive their neighbors in 
social status than in partisan terms. It follows then, that 
when respondents tell us that their neighborhoods are strongly 
Republican,',,what they mean is that their neighbors are middle- 
class, and.they therefore assume them to be Republicans. This 
fact, coupled with the historical tendency for the Democratic 
Party to become more middle-class as the social structure of 
American society has shifted toward white-collar occupations, 
may explain why a larger proportion of Detroiters feel they 
are in Republican neighborhoods than there are Republican 
neighborhoods in Detroit. Indeed, this phenomenon would be 
expected to.appear all over the country, since the American 
electorate has shifted toward the Democratic Party. l3 1t is 
not important that perceptions'of the social status of one's 
neighbors may be-incorrect. Moore has in. fact.demonstrated 
that..if two individuals are of the same objective status, the 
13. See David .R. .Segal, "Partisan Realignment. in. the United 
States: The Lesson of the 1964 Electipn," -Public Opinion 
Quarterly, (forthcoming) . 
direction of influence between them will be determined by per- 
ceived status differences. 
14 
Finally, the observed pattern may be a result of selective- 
ly perceiving (or misperceiving) the partisan climate of one's 
community to support one's own partisan judgement. 
The selectivity hypothesis itself may be based on two 
different, but related, bodies of social-psychological theory. 
On the one hand, theories of interpersonal attraction and 
attitudinal balance tell us that people are likely to choose 
as friends others who agree with them in the evaluation of 
salient objects. l5 From this point of view, if a person eval- 
uated the Republicans positively and the Democrats negatively, 
and his party choice were important to him, we would associate 
with people who shared his evaluations of the parties. Since 
he is likely to judge the composition of his community on the 
basis of his own interpersonal contacts, he will see similari- 
ties between his own attitudes and those prevalent in his com- 
munity . 
On the other hand, arguing from the assumptions of 
cognitive dissonance theory, one need not postulate selective 
14. Moore, op. ci.t. 
15. The most familiar of these are Heider's P-0-X and New- 
comb's A-B-X models. See Fritz Heider, The Psychology of 
Interpersonal Relations (New York: Wiley, -1958), and 
Theodore M. Newcomb, "Varieties of Interpersonal Attrac- 
tion," in Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander, .eds., Group 
Dynamics (Second edition: Evanston: - Row, .peterson, 1962) , 
104-li9. ''see also James S. Coleman,  omm mu nit^. Con- 
flict (New York: Free Press, 1957) , pp. .-.11-1'2. ' 
association. Dissonance theory holds that having chosen among 
alternatives, an individual will seek support for his decision. 
One mode of behavior is of course to associate only with people 
who agree with him. In this case the outcome will be similar 
to that described above. However, there are alternative means 
of achieving attitudinal consonance. Cooper and Jahoda, for 
example, discuss the misperception of information as a means of 
avoiding dissonance. 16 
There is little support for the selectivity hypothesis in 
either the literature on political attitudes and behavior, or 
in our own data. 
The balance and-dissonance models assume a coherent set of 
attitudes and/or object orientations such that knowing one or 
more elements in the set of attitudes facilitates the prediction 
of other elements. Converse, however, has demonstrated that with 
regard to political affect, at least, such coherent attitude 
\ 
systems are not characteristic of the general population. 17 
Moreover, there is an implicit assumption underlying the selec- 
tivity hypotheses that it makes a difference which alternative 
is chosen: Most.Arnericans make arather-minimal investment in 
politics, and Almond and Verba have in fact demonstrated that 
partisans -in..Arnerica.describe the opposing party in much, the, 
same,terms that they describe their-own, ,and, 
16. E. Cooper and M. Jahoda, "The Evas-ion of Propaganda," 
Journal of Psychology, vol. -23 (1947) , pp. -15-25. For a 
more,general discussion see Leon FestingertkA Theory of 
C~gnitive~Dissonance (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1957). 
17. Philip E. Converse, ."The Nature of..Belief.Systems in Mass 
." ~ublics," ..in.~avid E. Apter, ed.,~.~deology.and.~'iscontent~ 
(New ~ork: . Free Press, 1964):~. .206-261. . 
a perhaps more revealing test, are indifferent to their 
children marrying across party lines. 18 
Our own data also fail to provide support for the selec- 
tivity hypothesis, although we may disconfirm the hypothesis 
only by inference. A majority of our respondents reported 
that.it didn't make any difference to them whether the Demo- 
crats or Republicans were in control of the government. 
Moreover, there is no evidence either that party choice was 
a criterion in choosing friends, or that the partisanship of 
one's friends was misperceived. In fact a majority of our 
respondents (53 per cent) reported that they did not discuss 
politics with their best friends, and 44 per cent were unable 
to state which candidate their best friend had supported in the 
last presidential election. A minority of our respondents (26 
per cent) did in fact find that they disagreed with friends 
and acquaintances on party choice, but half of these said 
that they weren't bothered by the fact, and an additional 12 
per cent thought that such disagreement was a good thing. 
There was no evidence of psychological distress resulting 
from such a situation. Indeed, these results seem to demon- 
strate, as earlier studies have shown, that contrary to the 
great amount of attitude change observed in social psychology 
laboratories under experimental conditions, relatively few 
people in the real world assign affect to political objects 
18. Gabriel A. Almond.and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture- 
(Princeton: Princeton- University Press, :1963) , pp, 125, 
in ways explicable by balance theory or dissonance theory 
considerations--both perspectives which are found highly use- 
ful in the analysis of data gathered in laboratory situations. 
19 
Let us now turn to the question of whether actual com- 
munity composition, perceived community composition, and 
organization memberships can serve as alternative bases of 
party choice. In order to determine the interrelationships 
among these factors, the mode of analysis used here was the 
"tree" technique. This method reduces the unexplained vari- 
ance in the dependent variable--here, political partisanship-- 
through the progressive non-symmetric splitting of the sample 
on the basis of a series of predictor variables. 
20 
In the first stage of the analysis, presented in Figure 1, 
the only variables input as predictors were the real political 
climate of the census tract in which the respondent resided, 
the perceived partisan composition of the neighborhood, and the 
respondent's occupation. These variables accounted 'for 15.9 
per cent of the total variance in partisanship. 
19. See Carl I. Hovland, "Reconciling Conflicting Results 
Derived from Experimental and Survey Studies of Attitude 
Change," in Ivan D. Steiner and Martin Fishbein, eds., 
Current Studies in Social Psychologx (New York: m t ,  
1965), pp. 173-186. 
20. The methpd is described in John A. Sonquist and James N. 
Morgan, The Detection-of Interaction Effects (Ann Arbor: 
Survey Research Center, university of Michigan, 1964). 
For an app-lication in the study of political behavior, 
see Morris Janowitz and David R. segal, "Social Cleavage 
and Party Affiliation: Germany, Great Britain, and the 
United States," American Journal of Sociology, vol. 72, 
no. 6 (May, 1967), pp. 601-618. 




6. Republican tract 
% G.O.P.=82.1 
N=67 11. Blue collar 
2. Republican, dis- % G.O.P.=68.0 
sensus or unclas- N=25 
sified tract 
% G.O.P.=58.3 




1. Total sample 
% G.O.P.=37.4 
N=673 
4. White collar or 
unclassified ' 
% G.O.P.=39.5 
N=114 8. Thinks neighbor- 
3. ~emocratic tract hood is strongly 
% G.O.P.=24.,8 G.O.P., or G.O.P. 
N=419 % G.O.P.=50.0 
I 5. Blue collar N=30 
% G.O.P.=19.3 
Ne305 
9. Thinks neighbor- 
hood is 50-50, 
Democratic, 
strongly Demo- 
cratic, D.K. or 
% G.O.P.=16.0 
N=275 
Figure 1. First phase of "tree-analysis". Variance accounted for = 15.9 per cent of 
total sum of squares. Figures at each split represent the per cent.reduction 
of the total sum of squares by that split. 
The groups are numbered by the order in which splits 
occurred. The first split (groups 2 and 3 ) ,  accounting for 
8.4 per cent of the total variance, demonstrates the obvious 
tautology that Republicans tend to live in Republican areas 
and Democrats tend to live in Democratic areas. The second 
split (groups 4 and 5) demonstrates that while there is a 
significant class differential in party choice (20 per cent), 
a minority of white-collar workers who live in Democratic 
tracts consider themselves Republicans. 
Groups 4 and 5 can be compared to the corresponding 
groups in Republican tracts, 16 and 17. Note that for these 
four groups, occupational differences account for an average 
difference of 21 per cent in Republican preference. The 
differences due to political composition of the tract, on 
the other hand, are more than double that figure. More than 
two-thirds of the blue-collar workers living in predominantly 
Republican tracts consider themselves to be Republicans. 
The effect of community perception is apparent in the 
split from group 5. Among blue-collar workers in Democratic 
tracts, perceptions of the partisan composition of neighbor- 
hoods account for a 34 per cent difference in Republican 
preferences (groups 8 and 9). Half of the blue collar 
respondents in Democratic tracts who perceive their neighbor- 
hoods to be Republican are themselves Republican. While in 
this phase of the analysis, only one group was split on 
community perception, this variable accounted for only slightly 
less variance than did social class (2.0 as compared to 2.2 
per cent). 
In the second phase of the analysis membership in volun- 
tary associations and, once again, perceived coxynunity partisan- 
ship, were used to explain the residual variance remaining in. 
the fi.nal groups of phase I (groups 4, 7-11 in Figure 1). .It. 
was hypothesized that low SES individuals would be more respon- 
sive to perceived commun-ity partisanship patterns than would 
high SES respondents, and that organization memberships would 
emerge as an alternative source of partisan cues to those 
furnished within the local community. 
We have seen above that working-class respondents in Demo- 
cratic tracts who tend to vote Republican also tend to think 
that their neighborhoods are Republican. Regardless of the 
direction of causality, there is consonance between party 
preference and perceived social climate in this case. The 
. second phase of the analysis failed to produce further-meaning- 
ful splits in this segment of the sample, and groups 8 and 9 
21 remained as final groups. , 
Among high SES respondents in Democratic census tracts 
(group 4, Figure l), we did achieve further specification on 
the basis of union membership and community perception. These 
data are presented in .Figure 2. Union members in this group 
were more Democr,atic than were non-members, and the union 
members comprised a final group, with no further- splits. Among 
those not associated with unions, a split emerged on the basis 
21. Meaningful splits were defined operationally as those 
reducing the original total sum of squares by .4 per cent 
or more. 
14. Thinks neighborhood 
is strongly Demo- 
cratic, Democratic, 
50-50, D.K. or N.A. 
% G.O.P.=49.3 
12. Not union member N=77 
% G.O.P.=45.3 
N=95 
15. Thinks neighborhood 
* 
Parent group: white is strongly Republi- can or Republican collar or unclassi- 
% G.O.P.=27.8 fied occupations; N=18 Democratic tracts - 
% G.O.P.=39.5 




Figure 2. Second phase of "tree analysis", plate 1. Variance accounted 
for = 1.6 per cent of total sum of squares. 
of community perception that differed from the pattern observed 
above. Here, those people who perceived their communities to 
be Republican (perhaps because the communities were middle- 
class) tended to support the Democratic Party despite these 
perceptions. The fact that these middle-class people misper- 
ceived the local partisan context and then deviated from the 
perceived context supports our hypothesis that the middle-class 
is less susceptible to local community pressure. Within these 
same tracts, blue collar respondents who thought their neighbor- 
hoods were Republican were almost two times more likely to 
consider themselves Republican (Figure 1, group 8) than were 
white collar respondents. Our data also support our claim that, 
at least for the middle-class, community partisanship is - not 
misperceived in order to support one's own party preference. 
Group 14 in Figure 2 is somewhat misleading in its sugges- 
tion that middle-class non-union members in Democratic tracts 
who tend to vote Republican tend to perceive their neighborhoods 
as Democratic. In fact, of the 77 cases in this category, 42 
were D.K. or N.A. responses on perceptions of neighborhood 
partisanship, and an additional 22 respondents thought the 
neighborhoods were about half Democratic and half Republican. 
Later splits, not reported here because of the minute amounts 
of variance accounted for, suggested that people who thought 
their neighborhoods were strongly Democratic were somewhat less 
likely to be Republican, and that Republican support was great- 
est when perception of community partisanship was not ascer- 
tained. The strongest statement that can be made at this point 
is that middle-class people who live in Democratic neighbor- 
hoods and prefer the Republican Party tend not to attach a 
partisan complexion to the neighborhood. This may well be 
because they have limited involvement in the local community. 
The relationship between perceived community partisan- 
ship, voluntary association membership, and party choice is 
suggested by the phase I1 analysis of those respondents who 
lived in dissensus tracts, or in tracts for which partisan 
composition could not be ascertained (Figure 1, group 7). 
These data are presented in Figure 3. Here, as in the above 
case, the first split was on union membership, with a 37 per 
cent difference in preference for the Republican Party between 
union members and non-members. Among non-members, .there were 
then a series of splits on organization memberships, with 
members of nationality or race organizations preferring the 
Democratic party, 22 and members of professional organizations 
or church connected organizations tending to.support the 
Republican Party. Of the people in tracts characterized by 
political dissensus who were members neither of unions nor 
ethnic orsanizations nor ~rofessional orqanizations nor church 
connected organizations, there was a split on the basis of 
perceived neighborhood partisanship: people who thought 
3. 
chose the Republican Partyin.85.7..per cent of the cases,-as 
. - 
22. Cf. Michael Parenti, "Ethnic. politics and the Persistence 
of ~thnic Identification," American Political Science. 






















Figure 3. Second phase of "tree analysis", plate 2. Variance accounted for = 8.7 per cent 
of total sum of squares. 
neighborhood composi t ion [F igu re  3 ,  groups 24 and 2 5 ) .  More- 
o v e r ,  a t  t h e  next. s p l i t ,  people  who thought  t h e i r  neighbor-  
hoods were about  evenly  s p l i t  o r  were Democratic chose t h e  
G.O.P. i n  s l i g h t l y  more than  one q u a r t e r  of  t h e  c a s e s ,  whi le  
t h o s e  people  who d i d  n o t  know t h e  p o l i t i c a l  c o n t e x t  of  t h e i r  
neighborhoods (43 of  t h e  5 0  c a s e s  i n  group 26 were D . K .  
r e sponses )  tended t o  choose t h e  Republican P a r t y .  
Among union members i n  t h i s  phase of t h e  a n a l y s i s ,  
membership i n  church-connected groups reduced t h e  tendency 
t o  suppor t  t h e  Democratic P a r t y ,  wh i l e  membership i n  v e t e r a n s  
o r g a n i z a t i o n s  s t r o n g l y  r e i n f o r c e d  t h e  tendency f o r  Democratic 
p re fe rence .  
The on ly  o t h e r  meaningful  s p l i t  t h a t  emerged from phase 
I1 of t h e  a n a l y s i s  s e p a r a t e d  b l u e - c o l l a r  workers l i v i n g  i n  
Republican t r a c t s  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  union membership. Non- 
members w e r e  more t han  tw ice  a s  l i k e l y  t o  suppor t  t h e  Repub- 
l i c a n  P a r t y  than  union members w e r e . .  These d a t a  a r e  p re sen ted  
' 7  
i n  F igu re  4 .  However, t h e  impact  of t h e  l o c a l  c o n t e x t  may be 
seen i n  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  d e s p i t e  b l u e - c o l l a r  occupa t ions  and 
union membership, 40 p e r  c e n t  of t h e  l a t t e r  group p r e f e r r e d  
t h e  Republican Par.ty. 
The t r e e  a n a l y s i s  accounted f o r  27 p e r  c e n t  of t h e  
i n i t i a l  t o t a l  sum of squa re s  i n  p a r t y  p r e f e r e n c e .  The r e l a -  
t i v e  s t r e n g t h  of t h e  sou rces  of var iance,  i s  summarized i n  
Table  5.  
% G.O.P.=86.7 
c o l l a r  workers  i n  
Republ ican  census  
G.O.P.=68.0 
% G.O.P.=40 
F i g u r e  4 .  Second phase  of  " t r e e  a n a l y s i s " ,  p l a t e  3 .  Var iance  
accoun ted  f o r  = .8 p e r  c e n t  of  t o t a l  sum o f  s q u a r e s . '  
Table 5. Sources of Explained Variance in "Tree-Analysis". 
Per Cent of Variance 
Variable Accounted For 
Tract partisanship 11.7, 
Union membership 5.5 
Perception of neighborhood 
partisanship 
Membership in organizations 
other than unions 
Occupation 
Total 
Several conclusions may be drawn from this analysis. 
Beyond reaffirming the import of the local community in 
determining the party choice of working-class people, we 
have seen that worki:ng-class deviation.from the local parti- 
san norm can be accounted-for in part by perceptions of.the 
local context that differ from agg,regate reality. We have 
no evidence to argue, however, that such people misperceive 
reality. Rather,'they may well define nqighborhood in terms 
that our operations do not tap. In addition, it should be 
noted that people living in tracti without clear. cut parti- 
san modes, .who do not -belong to voluntary associations, con- 
form to their perceptions of community partisanship.. 
We .have also seen that middle-class people .are rela-. 
tively unaffected by local contexts, and in fact tend not 
to perceive their local neighborhoods as having a definable 
political climate. Where the neighborhood is viewed as parti- 
san, this perception has little bearing on the middle-class 
 individual.'^ own party preference, 
With respect to the relative effects of community and 
voluntary associ.ation memberships, we see here reason for tak- 
ing issue with Cox' expectations. The intensity of extensity 
of membership does not necessarily affect conformity to the 
neighborhood political mode. The most impressive fact regard- 
ing organizational members hi,^ in the present study is the 
relatively small number.of people who in fact belonged to 
organjzations. Among those people who were members, organiza- 
tion membership seems to be an alternative source of partisan 
cues regardless of its.territoria1 inten~ity.. Thus, if one 
were a member of a territorially intensive. organizati,on-. that- 
tended to support the Republican Party, e.g. a.local business- 
men's association, then even if the community within which the 
organization existed .were Democratic, one would be expected 
to vote Republican. 
It is important then, in studying the effects of organi- 
zation membership and.party choice, to note the nature of the 
organizations involved. Our present.data suggest, not sur- 
prisingly, that labor u.nion, and ethnic organization member- 
$ 
ships are assoc,iated with Democratic preference,. while. 
membership. in professional organizations and church-connected 
groups is indicative of Republican preference. 
